Workforce Bulletin

By: John F. Fullerton III

This is the first of a series of posts on practice and procedure in employment-related arbitrations before FINRA.  Check back often for future posts, subscribe by e-mail (see the sidebar), or follow @FSemployer on Twitter so you don’t miss any updates!

More than one lawyer has been burned by a FINRA arbitration panel that seemed ideal on paper, but then, at the hearing, just did not “get it.”  Conversely, a panel that initially looks troubling sometimes does a great job at the hearing and gets the decision right (i.e., in your favor, of course). And there ...

By:  John F. Fullerton III

The New York Court of Appeals recently upheld a jury verdict in favor of a brokerage firm employee who claimed that his employer breached an oral promise (and violated New York wage law) when it failed to pay him a guaranteed bonus of $175,000, to be paid at the end of his first year of employment.  The discussions with the hiring manager regarding compensation were not put in writing.  Nevertheless, the employee subsequently signed an acknowledgment in the formal employment application that  “compensation and benefits are at will and can be terminated, with or ...

Guest Post By: H. David Kotz

H. David Kotz is a Managing Director at Gryphon Strategies, a full-service investigation firm, which he joined in January 2012 after serving for over four years as the Inspector General for the SEC.  He was a guest speaker at Epstein Becker & Green’s March 7, 2012 breakfast briefing, “2012’s Key Issues for Financial Services Employers.”

The head of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Whistleblower program reported on March 14, 2012 that the SEC Whistleblower program has been receiving a continuous volume of complaints since the ...

By: Lauri F. Rasnick

FINRA recently announced that it fined Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (“Merrill”) one million dollars for failing to arbitrate claims with employees. See January 25, 2012 News Release.    The disputes at issue arose out of promissory notes executed by Merrill employees in connection with the Bank of America Corporation (“BOA”) acquisition.  After the BOA acquisition, Merrill created a program called the Advisor Transition Program (“ATP”).  Pursuant to this program, Merrill was to pay particular registered representatives lump sum ...

By: John F. Fullerton III

A recent New York state court decision granted a fairly unique petition to disqualify the attorney for a group of former employees from representing them in an intra-industry arbitration at FINRA. Why?  Because the lawyer had turned himself into a fact witness by negotiating the termination explanation in the U5 notice of two of the employees. The decision raises an interesting question about whether the same logic could be applied in a U5 expungement hearing at FINRA when there have been discussions between counsel about the U5 language, regardless of whether ...

By:  Dena L. Narbaitz

Here is the scenario:  your company, a FINRA Member Firm, terminates a broker for “violation of company policies” and reports this as the reason for termination on the broker’s Form U-5 (Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration).  The broker then sues your company in state court asserting several claims, including defamation for the language contained on his Form U-5.  Your company thinks there is a good legal basis to have the broker’s claims dismissed as a matter of law before the case is tried.  Should your company litigate the case ...

By Stuart M. Gerson

Lawson v. Fidelity Management & Research LLC, et al., No. 10-2240 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2012) (pdf), discussed in our February 16 posting, comes as a welcome development to privately-held companies that are providers of health care goods and services because it should, if followed generally, preclude whistleblowers from bringing the kinds of audit-related and financial accounting claims that are within the compass of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).

Many of these companies are, however, the recipients of payments that directly or indirectly involve funds ...

By: Christina Fletcher

Confronting an issue of first impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently held that the “whistleblower” protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) cover only employees of public companies, and do not extend to the employees of a public company’s contractors or subcontractors which are themselves private companies. Lawson v. Fidelity Management & Research LLC, et al., No. 10-2240 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2012) (pdf). This holding provides private-company employers with a potentially strong defense to claims of retaliation against employees. However, it should be anticipated that Congress may revisit the scope of the protections and ultimately expand them in response to Lawson.

Section 806 of SOX prohibits discrimination against employees who engage in protected whistleblowing activities and work for publicly traded companies subject to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).  In Lawson, Fidelity Investments, a public company covered by Section 806 of SOX, contracted with a private investment advisory firm to provide investment advisory services. Plaintiff Zang alleged that he had been terminated in retaliation for raising concerns about inaccuracies in a draft revised registration statement for certain Fidelity funds. Plaintiff Lawson alleged retaliation for raising concerns relating to cost accounting methodologies. She resigned her employment in September 2007, claiming constructive discharge. Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaints argued that the plaintiffs were not covered employees under Section 806 of SOX. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that subcontractors to a public company subject to SOX were protected by SOX’s whistleblower provision.

The First Circuit reversed, basing its decision on the language of SOX, principles of statutory interpretation, and SOX’s legislative history. The Court noted that plaintiffs’ suggested reading of the Act created anomalies and provided very broad coverage not intended by Congress. The Court explained that the clause “officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company” in the whistleblower protection provision goes to who is prohibited from retaliating or discriminating, not to who is a covered employee. Thus, covered employees are limited to employees of public companies

By Allen B. Roberts and Stuart M. Gerson

Those concerned with managing or insuring risk are affected increasingly by the evolution of whistleblowing, especially as new laws and interpretations since 2009 have changed the stakes by redefining whistleblower protections and bounty award entitlements.

Virtually any risk management program written prior to the 2008 elections may need to be recalibrated to take account of new definitions introduced by whistleblower features of legislation nominally concerning healthcare and financial services, but in reality reaching much ...

Allen B. Roberts and Stuart Gerson  are co-authors of the recent Law360 article Examining The Purpose Of Sarbanes-Oxley. This summary of recent Administrative Review Board actions explains the shift in the standards whistleblowers must meet, and how employers should prepare for this new era of litigation.

In previous articles and postings, we have cautioned that legislative policy of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act threatens to circumvent corporate compliance programs and drive whistleblowers having vital information outside the organization in the hope of receiving rich bounty awards. In a recent article published by Bloomberg Law Reports®, Allen Roberts discusses some of the challenges businesses subject to SEC jurisdiction need to address in the face of the SEC’s Final Rule – mindful that the plaintiffs’ bar has geared up to ...

By: Stuart M. Gerson

On May 16, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk (pdf), holding that the public disclosure bar of the False Claims Act (FCA) is triggered by a federal agency’s written response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. This important, and much awaited, decision makes it clear that an agency’s FOIA response constitutes a “report” for purposes of the FCA’s public disclosure bar, which forecloses private parties from bringing qui tam whistleblower suits to recover falsely or ...

By: Allen B. Roberts, Stuart M. Gerson and Daniel J. Schuch

In a case packed with allegations of the kind rarely found beyond the script of a soap opera, the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") Administrative Review Board ("ARB") determined that protected activity under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") does not require a showing of fraud against shareholders. Rather, per the ARB, it is sufficient that an employee reasonably believes conventional mail or wire fraud has occurred. The holding in Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (pdf) evidences the ARB's adherence to a literal, and clinical, construction of SOX – and serves as a clear indication of the ARB's willingness to reach beyond the underlying objectives envisioned by Congress in the wake of the infamous collapse of Enron and WorldCom. If upheld and followed, Brown effectively expands SOX whistleblower protections well beyond the intended beneficiary of the law – the "innocent investor."

By Allen B. Roberts and John Houston Pope

With virtually no fanfare, a major sector of the American workforce – those who handle food – won whistleblower protections under the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (“FSMA”), Pub. L. No. 111-353. The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) describes FSMA, signed into law on January 4, 2011, as improving food safety by preventing hazards “from farm to table” and making “everyone in the global food chain responsible for safety.”

While much attention and controversy surrounded the whistleblower bounty awards of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) enacted in July 2010, the potentially more significant whistleblower provision of FSMA passed in the final days of the 2010 legislative session in routine and undramatic fashion. Indeed, the most significant whistleblower portions of the bill did not emerge until a version of the bill was reported out of a Senate committee in mid-November. (No written report explained the major changes written into the law.) Because of the sheer size of the workforce that touches food and the comprehensive definition of “protected activity,” however, the relatively unheralded law extends coverage and companion employer obligations in potentially unprecedented measure. The claims that result could dwarf those arising under whistleblower laws receiving far more media and business attention.

By David W. Garland and Allen B. Roberts

Major provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) will gain substance and vitality only with amplifying interpretive rules. On December 17 the period closed for submitting comments on rules proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement whistleblower provisions added in a new Section 21F to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). With the comment period having closed, and final rules expected to be implemented in the Spring of 2011, this is a good time to take account of the proposed rules regarding the statute’s anti-retaliation provisions and their potential impact on employers.   

Dodd-Frank authorizes bounty awards to eligible whistleblowers who voluntarily provide original information to the SEC about a violation of the federal securities laws leading to a successful enforcement action and resulting in a monetary sanction exceeding $1,000,000.  It is not surprising that much of the analysis and media attention generated by Dodd-Frank concerns the bases on which the SEC will make determinations about paying potentially enormous bounty awards that can range from 10% to 30% of the amount of monetary sanctions. 

Section 21F also protects whistleblowers against retaliation by their employers, with the scope of protection circumscribed by the statutory definition of a whistleblower.  Rather than providing protection equally for internal disclosures to the employer and external disclosures to authorized agencies and authorities, as is seen commonly in whistleblower statutes, Section 21F protects only certain external disclosures. It defines a whistleblower narrowly as any individual, acting alone or jointly, who provides information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC in the manner prescribed by the SEC.

Whistleblower considerations are likely to be especially prominent in the new year and as a new Congressional term begins, leading to the 2012 election campaign.

Please join me and other attorneys from my firm, EpsteinBeckerGreen, as we present a full-day program covering labor and employment law topics that have increasingly impacted employers over the past two years. In addition, we will offer an outlook of what we should expect in the coming two years. Our keynote speaker is Darrel Thompson, Senior Advisor to Senate Majority Harry Reid, who will offer comments concerning the ...

An in-house patent attorney who protested that his employer knowingly assigned a $50 million value to acquire patents alleged to be worthless could not link his discharge to whistleblower activity protected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Affirming dismissal in Vodopia v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V., et al., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed that: (1) the complaint clearly centered on the plaintiff’s concern that the patents were invalid, not on the value the company assigned to them; and (2) the complaint did not allege that the $50 million value assigned to those patents was ever reported to the public or to shareholders.

Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806 makes it unlawful for an employer to take an unfavorable personnel action by discharging, or in any other manner discriminating against, an employee in the terms or conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee to provide information or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of certain enumerated federal laws. 

In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Congress has crafted an array of bounty awards and whistleblower protections broadly affecting securities, commodities and futures, and consumer financial products firms and those associated with them. Although there was an opportunity to create incentives promoting internal reporting in aid of corporate compliance programs and to rationalize whistleblowing with standardized definitions, procedures and remedies, Congress went in different directions. The result is a set of whistleblower ...

[Ed. Note: We thank our colleague Richard D. Tuschman for this post, which was originally published on EBG’s Florida Employment & Immigration Law Blog]

An employee claiming Whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must have actually believed that his company’s conduct was illegal in order to state a claim under the Act, according to a recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Gale v. U.S. Department of Labor, Case No. 08-14232 11th Cir. June 25, 2010) (pdf).

The case arose when Michael Gale was terminated from his employment at World Financial Group (“WFG”). Gale filed a Whistleblower complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which enforces the SOX Whistleblower provisions. Gale alleged that he was terminated because he opposed decisions made by company officers relating to waste and misuse of corporate funds, and because he raised concerns regarding the alleged violation of SEC rules and regulations.

Under SOX, a publicly traded company and its officers are prohibited from discharging an employee for providing information to a supervisory authority about conduct that the employee “reasonably believes” constitutes a violation of federal laws against mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, any SEC rule or regulation, or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 

We continue to follow developments on Wall Street financial reform legislation and the whistleblower rights and protections that will come with its enactment. Now recast as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the bill will be considered with its Conference Report (pdf).

A preview of the legislation is addressed in the interview of Allen Roberts by Bloomberg legal analyst Spencer Mazyck, now available in video, below:

By: Allen B. Roberts, Victoria M. Sloan

The typical set of protections or awards featured in a familiar array of whistleblower statutes has a new entrant with the imposition of mandated reporting in the Elder Justice Act section of the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”). In a notable departure from other laws, the Elder Justice Act provides that every individual employed by or associated with a long-term care facility as an owner, operator, agent or contractor has an independent obligation to report a “reasonable suspicion” of a crime affecting residents or recipients of care. Reports must be made directly to both the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and one or more law enforcement entities in as little as two hours following the formation of the reasonable suspicion.

Although limited to reports of crimes against residents and recipients of services of long-term care facilities, the mandate of the Elder Justice Act sets a new standard of conduct – and backs it up with stiff penalties affecting long-term care facilities and those associated with them.

A new wave of whistleblower monetary awards and protections will come to the financial services industry once the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (RAFSA) is enacted. With final resolution of differences between House and Senate versions accomplished, both houses of Congress now will consider the conference committee bill.

Bloomberg legal analyst Spencer Mazyck has been following whistleblowing changes we are likely to see with the anticipated enactment of RAFSA. Spencer explored with me some contours and ramifications of the pending legislation during ...

On the heels of its 2-1 decision in Hyman v. KD Resources, allowing equitable estoppel to extend the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) statute of limitations (noted in our blog posting of April 20, 2010), the Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (ARB) has issued a unanimous decision clarifying the burden for whistleblowers to survive dismissal of complaints that are not filed within the explicit 90-day statute of limitations. Daryanani v. Royal & Sun Alliance, ARB No. 08-106, ALJ No. 2007-SOX-79 (ARB May 27, 2010).

Adhering to the principle that equitable estoppel may apply when certain employer conduct interferes with a whistleblower-employee’s exercise of rights, the ARB nevertheless refused to extend the SOX statute of limitations on the basis of alleged inaction by an employer. Holding equitable estoppel would not be available in the circumstances, the ARB observed that the employer had no affirmative obligation to:

• inform the employee of potential causes of action,
• inform the employee of time limitations applicable under statutes creating a cause of action, or
• counter-sign a severance release agreement within the statute of limitations deadline.

By Allen B. Roberts, Douglas Weiner

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held in Lawson v. FMR LLC (pdf) that SOX coverage can apply not only to employees of publicly traded companies, but to employees of private management services firms as well.

The typical business model in the financial services industry is that public mutual fund companies generally have no employees of their own, but are managed by private investment advisors. The public company’s investment assets are thus managed by employees of a private employer.

Plaintiffs, employees of a private investment advisor to a public mutual fund, alleged they had engaged in activity protected by SOX, for which they suffered retaliation. The employer moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing plaintiffs were not covered by the Section 806 whistleblower protections because they were not employees of a publicly traded company. The defendants noted the very title of the whistleblower section of SOX is “Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud.” The plaintiffs countered that Congress intended to extend coverage to private employees in cases such as the plaintiffs.

The Lawson court, the first federal court to decide the issue, agreed with the putative whistleblowers and held that SOX covers employees of private firms providing contract services to the public company.

Like several other statutes, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) requires whistleblowers to initiate their complaints by an administrative filing with the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration. But when a preferred outcome in that designated arena appears unlikely, a whistleblower may be allowed to abandon the administrative process before a final order issues and seek a new opportunity in court.  Faced with the prospect of another round of de novo litigation, employers may turn increasingly to pre-dispute arbitration agreements as an alternative to litigating in court.

As exemplified by Stone v. Instrumentation Laboratory Co.(4th Cir. 2009) (pdf), filing an administrative complaint and participating in the administrative process, as required by SOX, do not foreclose access to a federal court before the issuance of a final administrative order. The court explained that the preclusion doctrine, intended to avoid duplicative litigation, does not bar de novo consideration by a federal district court if a lawsuit is filed at least 180 days after the administrative filing and before the Department of Labor has issued a final decision, even where administrative proceedings have progressed to Administrative Review Board consideration of an administrative law judge’s dismissal of a complaint. 

By Allen B. Roberts, Douglas Weiner

While most attention in the legislative and political process leading to enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) focused on the significant impact on the delivery of health care, employers need to be aware, also, of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The FLSA amendments impose certain employer responsibilities in providing health care benefits, confer whistleblower protections and authorize the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") to undertake increased enforcement related to health care.

While other features of the FLSA amendments are addressed in our client alert, "Health Care Reform Legislation Amends the Fair Labor Standards Act to Give the U.S. Department of Labor Increased Enforcement Authority over Health Care," here is a summary of whistleblower protections:

By: Allen B. Roberts, Victoria M. Sloan

Employers who thought they were free of exposure if no complaint was filed within the statute of limitations applicable in Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX") and other whistleblower claims administered by the Secretary of Labor need to recalibrate their risk based on a recent decision allowing equitable estoppel.

In Hyman v. KD Resources, an employee missed the 90-day SOX statute of limitations by filing his complaint 160 days after he was discharged. Two newly appointed members of the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) allowed the complaint to survive and remanded it to the Administrative Law Judge who had dismissed it as untimely.

By Stuart M. Gerson

Suits in the name of the United States under the Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) brought by private individuals known as qui tam relators are among the most common forms of whistleblower actions in the federal system. The Supreme Court rendered its much-anticipated decision in Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District, et al. v. United States ex rel. Wilson (pdf), imposing a significant limitation on the ability of these relators to satisfy an important jurisdictional bar.

The FCA authorizes both the Attorney General and private qui tam relators to bring actions against persons who make or facilitate fraudulent claims for payment from the United States. However, in the absence of the government, a relator will be barred from proceeding on his own if the action is based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in, inter alia, "a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office ("GAO") report, hearing, audit, or investigation." 31 U. S. C. §3730(e)(4)(A). The Graham County case involved federal contracts and funding for the repair of flood damage. The relator, Wilson, a local government employee, alerted both federal and county and state officials to irregularities in performance. Both the county and the state issued reports making findings about these potential irregularities and Wilson thereupon filed a qui tam action against the county conservation districts administering the contracts. The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it held that the allegations publicly disclosed in the county and state reports constituted "administrative" reports under the FCA's public disclosure bar. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that only federal administrative reports may trigger the public disclosure bar.